There are two types of surrogacy arrangement. In gestational surrogacy the surrogate is artificially inseminated with the embryo of the contracting couple. The surrogate shares no genetic material with the child (Surrogacy UK, 207). Contrastingly, in traditional surrogacy, the surrogate mothers eggs are used, thus, she is genetically tied to the child she carries (ibid). Furthermore, a surrogate can be altruistic, wherein she is not paid for her work, but her expenses are covered by the contracting parents. This form of surrogacy is legal in the UK. Alternatively, commercial surrogacy involves both payment of expenses and a wage for the surrogates service. This form of surrogacy is illegal in the UK, however it is legal in the US and countries such as India and Ukraine (Sensible Surrogacy, 208). Therefore, within the market of contract pregnancy lies a multitude of other factors which may affect our attitudes towards it. Due to the largely controversial nature of the market, there are a number of arguments for the moral impermissibility of the market. I will firstly explore some essentialist arguments for the impermissibility of the market, before arguing that Satzs egalitarian argument is more compelling.
Subsequently, Satzs asymmetry thesis, argues that there is
a certain asymmetry between the reproductive market and other forms of labour (Satz, 200). There is something instinctively different about the selling of womens wombs, to other forms of labour. Essentialist arguments claim the reproductive market is inappropriately valued. Essentialist arguments claim womens wombs are treated as a mere commodity, and that the market reflects attitudes that womens reproductive labour has no non-instrumental value (Brennan & Jaworski, 205: 058). Satz cites Pateman, who argues a womans ability to reproduce is integral to her sense of identity and personhood. Pateman focuses on the contracting of womens bodies in prostitution, and concludes that our sexuality should not be treated as an alienable commodity (Satz, 200: 20). However, Satz argues we cannot place weight on this argument considering the existence of other forms of work in which people sell things which are also integral to their personhood. For example, Satz argues a Rabbi sells their services, but would consider their religion an integral part of who they are (ibid). In addition, this argument could also be applied to sperm donors. A sperm donor is selling a by-product of his sexuality, however, this is largely an uncontroversial market, whilst surrogacy is contentious.